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Abstract
What are the economic mechanisms that account for sudden growth spurts?
Are these mechanisms similar across episodes? Focusing on the economic resur-
gence of the BRICs over the last decade, we employ the Business Cycle Ac-
counting methodology developed by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007) to
address these questions. Our results highlight that while e¢ ciency wedges do
contribute in a large part to growth, especially in Brazil and Russia, there is an
increasing importance of investment wedge especially in the late 2000s, noted
in China and India. The results are typically related to the stages of devel-
opment with Brazil and Russia coming o¤ a crisis to grow in the 2000s, while
India and China were already on a stable growth path. Our conclusions are
robust to alternative methodological extensions where we allow shocks to the
trend component of e¢ ciency as opposed to traditional shocks to the cyclical
component, as well as to standard modications where we allow for invest-
ment adjustment costs. Relating improvements in wedges to institutional and
nancial reforms, we nd that nancial development and improvements in ef-
fective governance in BRICs are consistent with improvements in investment
and e¢ ciency wedges that led to growth.
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At its simplest, a growth economy should be regarded as one that is
likely to experience rising productivity, which, together with favorable
demographics, points to economic growth that outpaces the global aver-
age........but an economy also needs su¢ cient size and depth in order to
allow investors not only to invest, but also to exit when appropriate. So
we opted for the following: any economy outside the so-called developed
world that accounts for at least 1% of current global GDP should be de-
ned as a growth economy.      Jim ONeill (M.D. & Head of
Global Economic Research at Goldman Sachs)
1 Introduction
In the last decade, the world economic scenario saw some new players- Brazil, Russia,
India and China. Jim ONeill, who coined the term BRICto identify this group,
predicted in 20011 that, within the next decade, weight of BRICS, especially China
in the world economy would grow. The predictions have proved to be quite accurate.
Cumulative share of the BRIC nations in the world gross domestic product (GDP)
has grown from about 16% in 2000 to 26% in 2011. In the current world GDP
ranking by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China and India occupy the
second and third spots (the top spot still belongs to the United States), while Russia
and Brazil take the sixth and the seventh spots (Table 1). The trade volume of the
group currently takes up 15% of the world trade2. Jointly, this group of countries is
home to about 40% of the world population.
While recent growth literature has focused on identifying economic factors (prim-
itive shocks) that made this growth possible, a less explored but equally important
task is to identify the mechanisms through which these shocks work. Is there a single
mechanism at work, or are the mechanisms as varied as the countries themselves?
We explore this question in this paper. To this end, we employ a Business Cycle
Accounting (BCA) wedgemethodology formulated by Cole and Ohanian (2004),
Mulligan (2005) and Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (henceforth CKM, 2007) amongst
others, to account for the broader role played by the classical economic mechanisms -
changes in productivity and changing factor market distortions- in accounting for the
economic growth in Brazil, Russia, India and China. Our hope is that the answers we
nd might provide guidelines for other nations embarking on a similar development
path.
1"Building Better Global Economic BRICs" - Global Economics Paper No. 66
2This was reported by China Daily on April 14; 2011 when the third BRICS summit took place
in Sanya, China (the "S" in BRICS stands for South Africa that joined BRIC group in 2010 to
form BRICS).
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Comparing the remarkable performance of the BRICs in the last decade with that
of the earlier decade of the 1990s3, we identify two distinct mechanisms at work: i)
in Brazil and Russia, that emerged from a crisis to experience sharp growth over
the last two decades, distortions in the investment market are responsible for the
relative stagnation during the 1990s while improvement in production e¢ ciency is
the single most important factor in accounting for the rapid growth in the 2000s;
ii) in contrast, in India and China which were on a relatively stable growth path
since the 1990s, while changes in production e¢ ciency account for a large part of the
output uctuation in the 1990s , decline in the investment market distortions are
the main source of the rapid growth in the 2000s; particularly accounting for growth
in the latter half. What is also interesting is that in none of the economies do labor
wedges capturing labor market distortions play any role in accounting for growth
in the 2000s. Government consumption wedges capturing changes in government
expenditure partially aids China4 but is ine¤ective in the other three nations. These
ndings suggest that whatever policy or institutional changes were responsible for
the rapid growth of the 2000s worked primarily by increasing production e¢ ciency
or by reducing investment market frictions.
Next, we use the equivalence resultsof BCA analysis to tie the observed ac-
counting results to some indices reecting institutional and policy changes in a bid
to examine which reforms are consistent with observed improvements in production
e¢ ciency and decline in investment market distortions. We observe an improvement
in credit worthiness as well as access to credit in all the BRIC nations that is consis-
tent with declining investment market frictions and increasing e¢ ciency. In addition,
while not all institutional and governance indicators that we examine are consistent
with observed improvements in e¢ ciency and investment climate, improvements in
political stability to some extent and government e¤ectiveness to a large degree are
consistent with observed time series patterns of e¢ ciency and investment wedges.
However, the BRICs still have a long distance to go to catch up to the developed
West in other areas of governance like control of corruption or rule of law.
Our work can be related to two distinct strands of literature. Literature on
BRIC nations have primarily focused on isolating the singular causes of growth. In
the context of China, researchers have employed variations of the Real Business Cy-
cle (RBC) model to study the impact of productivity and nancial market access
(Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti, 2011; Hsu and Zhao, 2009), resource reallocation
3We restrict the prior period to the 1990s and not before that since Russian Federation was
formed only in the nineties and we want to have the same time period for all nations to make
comparison easier.
4The role of government consumption wedges turn out to be model specic. While it plays a
minimal role in our benchmark, its contribution increases in the alternative models considered.
2
from agriculture to non-agriculture (Dekle and Vandenbroucke, 2011), World Trade
Organization membership (Bajona and Chu, 2010) as well as opening up to world
trade (Fujiwara, Otsu and Saito, 2011) as potential causes of growth. Productivity
growth in general (Bosworth and Collins, 2008) and service sector productivity in
particular (Jones and Sahu, 2009) have been examined for their role in the Indian
growth experience as well. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) employ an RBC framework
to study a problem of a slightly di¤erent nature how resource misallocation has
actually kept China and India from realizing their full potential. Focus on the rise of
the other two BRIC nations, Brazil and Russia has been limited. While the creation
of the oil stabilization fund in Brazil has been analyzed for its role in stabilizing the
economy (Merlevede, Schoors and Aarle, 2007), most studies on Brazil and Russia
focus on causes of business cycle downturns (Braguinsky and Myerson, 2007; Mer-
levede, Schoors and Aarle, 2007; Kanczuk, 2004), and not growth, per se. What
distinguishes our study from these previous strands of research is that while most
of the earlier literature focuses on the drivers of growth (referred to as primitives
in BCA literature), our focus is on identifying the channels through which these
external drivers might have worked to successfully accelerate the BRIC economies.
While identication of primary drivers is important, simply adding various ex-
ogenous shocks to a classical RBC model just to replicate data moments is not very
useful for business cycle analysis (Cooley and Hansen, 1995; CKM 2007) . Equally
important to nding the key shocks is the identication of the channels through
which these shocks operate something at the heart of the BCA methodology. The
BCA methodology applies a two-pronged approach to deconstruct economic or busi-
ness cycle movements that is particularly suited for our analysis. In step one, various
economic frictions are modelled as wedgesthat distort equilibrium conditions in a
standard RBC model and keep an economy from achieving the rst best outcome5.
The original BCA methodology contains e¢ ciency, government consumption, invest-
ment and labor wedges that are estimated using the relevant equilibrium conditions
and the data of output, consumption, investment and labor. In step two, the esti-
mated wedges are fed back into the model to ascertain their marginal contributions
in generating the observed economic outcome. These wedges are the channels
through which external forces like institutional or policy changes a¤ect the economy.
Most existing BCA studies have employed the framework to study economic uc-
tuations, in particular crisis episodes (CKM, 2007; Kersting, 2008; Chakraborty,
5E¢ ciency wedges appear as time-varying productivity. Labor and investment wedges appear
as taxes on labor and capital income, where taxes represent not just actual tax rates but
broadly the distortions a¤ecting the labor and investment decisions. Government consumption
wedge appears as government expenditure (in a closed economy setup, net exports are also added
to government expenditure) .
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2009; Kobayashi and Inaba, 2006). Once again, majority of these studies focus on a
single country. In terms of conducting a comparative multi-country analysis employ-
ing the BCA methodology, our paper is closer to Cho and Doblas-Madrid (2012),
Otsu (2010a) as well as Lama (2011). While, overwhelmingly, BCA approach to
date has been employed to dissect a crisis, theoretically there is no reason why the
BCA procedure cannot be used to deconstruct growth as we do here, though such
use of BCA in literature is limited. Some studies that have applied the BCA proce-
dure to the BRIC nations include Graminho (2006) for Brazil during 1980   2000;
Chakraborty (2010) for India during 1982   2002; Ljungwall and Gao (2009) for
India during 1981  2006 and China during 1978  2006; He, Chang and Shi (2009)
for China during 1978   2006 and Lahiri and Yi (2009) who compared the growth
experience of two of the Indian states - Maharashtra and West Bengal6.
Two factors distinguish our study from the existing literature. First, data shows
that growth in the BRIC nations in the last decade really took o¤ in the second half,
a period that none of the existing studies look at. In our study, in order to focus
on the rapid growth period during the 2000s, we use data covering the 1990  2009
period. The time dimension turns out to be extremely important as there is a
trend break around 2005, when investment wedge emerges as major growth source
in India and China outweighing the contribution of e¢ ciency wedges, a nding that
earlier studies miss due to the truncation of their sample, thus erroneously concluding
that investment market channel has limited importance in accounting for growth7.
Second, unlike the previous studies that mostly focus on isolated growth episodes,
our attempt here is to bring all four BRIC nations on the same platform instead of
studying them as isolated cases, to analyze to what extent are growth spurts alike.
Our study enables us to directly compare the accounting results of BRIC nations
with each other since our data are consistent across countries in terms of the time
frame, the 1990s and 2000s, and the measurement units8. Such a comparison will
6Graminho (2006) applies BCA to Brazil over the 1980   2000 period and nds that e¢ ciency
wedges are important in accounting for the stagnation during the 1980s while in the 1990s, it is the
labor wedge. Chakraborty (2010) shows that e¢ ciency wedges are important in accounting for the
growth in India over the 1982  2002 period. Ljungwall and Gao (2009) studies the uctuations in
China and India during 1978 2006 and 1978 2006 respectively and nd that e¢ ciency wedges are
the main driving force of business cycles in both economies during this period. He, Chang and Shi
(2009) nds that e¢ ciency wedges are the most important wedge in accounting for business cycles
in the Chinese economy over the 1978   2006 period. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is
the rst to conduct a BCA analysis for the Russian economy.
7Lu (2012) who studies the East Asian growth miracle also stresses the importance of time
dimension in BCA studies to interpret roles of wedges.
8We primarily use the Penn World Tables data base which reports variables in PPP adjusted
2005 international dollars. Since we use the same data source for all countries, we can avoid
discrepancies in the denition of variables and price deators. Furthermore, we treat expenditures
on consumer durables as investment following standard BCA tradition while existing studies tend
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aide future researchers in ascertaining if a single growth model will be applicable to
a wide variety of cases, or there would be need for multiple models to study di¤erent
growth clusters, with the added advantage of having the identied mechanisms aid in
designing detailed models with primitives that would be successful in quantitatively
replicating the growth facts.
Applying the BCA procedure to the BRIC nations, while we do detect varia-
tions in the ability of di¤erent wedges to account for growth suggesting di¤erent
mechanisms at work, a common pattern does emerge once we come to the 2000s,
particularly the second half. In Brazil, deteriorations in investment and labor wedges
account for the stagnation in output during the 1990s while improvements in the e¢ -
ciency wedge is the main source of the rapid growth during the 2000s9. In Russia, the
deterioration in investment wedges account for the recession in the 1990s. However,
the rapid output growth in the 2000s is the handiwork of improvements in e¢ ciency
wedge, similar to the Brazilian experience. In India and China, e¢ ciency wedges
alone can account for the output uctuation almost perfectly up to the mid-2000s.
However, the rapid growth that was observed during the second half of the 2000s in
India is mainly due to the improvement in investment wedges while the deterioration
in e¢ ciency wedges during this latter half actually had a dampening e¤ect on output.
In China, while improvements in e¢ ciency wedges marginally contribute to the rapid
growth during the later 2000s , the major force that led to growth, as is the case in
India, is a reduction in investment market frictions that show up in the BCA model
as an improvement in the investment wedges. Government consumption wedges are
not important in accounting for changes in output, which is a common result to
those in existing BCA studies10. However, as we discuss in this paper, this does
not mean that government policies are unimportant as they can manifest themselves
as shocks to other wedges. While most existing BCA literature nd little impact of
investment on output during sharp recession periods, we nd that investment wedges
are important in accounting for the decade long recession in Russia and the medium
to long run growth in India and China through gradual capital accumulation.
To test the robustness of our ndings, we conduct two checks. The rst check
is to allow for shocks to the growth trend (as opposed to level) and analyze the
outcome comparing it with the results of the standard BCA application. In the tra-
ditional BCA approach, following in the lines of traditional RBC models, the shocks
to productivity are designed as shocks to its level- assuming a stable growth trend.
to include them in consumption.
9The only instance when labor wedges seem to play a role is to explain the stagnation of the
Brazilian economy in the 1990s, and it never emerges as an important mechanism to explain later
growth, either in Brazil or elsewhere in the other three nations.
10Since net exports are included in government consumption, changes in the trade balance in not
important in accounting for output changes.
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However, as argued by Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), emerging markets are charac-
terized by substantial volatility to the trend growth itself, rendering the assumption
of a stable trend somewhat unrealistic. Potentially, these alternative formulation of
shocks can have non-trivial consequences on the BCA accounting outcome as the ef-
ciency wedges are modeled after TFP and investment wedges depend on the future
expectations of TFP. The modication indeed a¤ects the measurement of e¢ ciency
and investment wedges, however, we essentially nd that the roles played by them are
similar to those in the benchmark case. Secondly, we add capital adjustment costs
assuming that it is technologically costly to convert output into installed capital.
As argued by Christiano and Davis (2006), the model simulations with investment
wedges is sensitive to inclusion or non-inclusion of investment adjustment costs and
can non-trivially a¤ect the conclusions. When we allow investment adjustment costs
in our benchmark model, we nd that our primary conclusions do not change.
So far, the existing literature and our rst part of the study helps us isolate the
broader channels of growth. What is also of interest is given the myriad institutional
and policy changes in the BRIC nations in the last decade, can we tie these insti-
tutional and economic reforms with our accounting results? In the second part of
our study, we use the equivalence resultsof the BCA theory to map the wedges
from our accounting results to some suggested drivers of growth, primarily focusing
on institutional and nancial market reforms. We nd that over the two decades of
nancial liberalization, all of the BRIC nations improved their credit rating, ease of
access to credit by businesses as well as costs associated with capital access, with
particular development since 2000. Increased availability of capital encourages invest-
ment, which lowers the expected return on investment due to diminishing marginal
product of capital. Therefore, the gap between the intertemporal marginal rate of
substitution and the expected return on capital would shrink, and result in an im-
provement in the investment wedge. Tying the improved investment climate with
commonly used institutional and governance indicators, we nd that while not all
the indicators examined are consistent with the time series features of particular
wedges, improvements to some degree in political stability (particularly in Russia)
since mid-2000s and to a much larger extent in government e¤ectiveness noticed in
all BRIC nations are consistent with observed improvements in production e¢ ciency
and declines in investment market distortions.
Our ndings are related to the growing literature on nancial liberalization and
growth. As documented in Kose, Prasad, Rogo¤ and Wei (2009), while existing em-
pirical literature has found little evidence of a positive relationship between capital
account liberalization and growth, equity market liberalizations do tend to have sig-
nicant growth e¤ects. Furthermore, the e¤ect of nancial liberalization on growth
can be divided into the direct e¤ect through investment growth and the indirect e¤ect
6
through productivity growth. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) state that investigat-
ing the latter e¤ect is far more important than considering the former. In theory,
credit inows can a¤ect production e¢ ciency by technology spillover (Findlay 1978),
improvement in investment quality (Obstfeld 1994) and improvement in quality of
governance (Rajan and Zingales 2003). Empirical literature on the relationship be-
tween nancial liberalization and productivity growth seems to support this linkage
in emerging economies11. Tying our accounting ndings with that of the equivalence
study, our results imply that if nancial liberalization during the 2000s was the main
driver of the rapid growth in the BRIC nations, they must have operated through
the e¢ ciency channel in Brazil and Russia, and through the investment channel in
India and China, opening up the interesting possibility of essentially the same set of
policies acting through di¤erent channels to a¤ect di¤erent nations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the
growth experiences in the BRIC nations. In section 3 we describe the business cycle
accounting model. In section 4 we explain the business cycle accounting procedure
and present the results. In section 5 we provide sensitivity analysis results. In section
6 we discuss the underlying factors that can explain the evolution of wedges. Section
7 concludes the paper.
2 Historical Evolution of Growth - One BRIC at
a time
While Brazil, Russia, India and China share impressive growth experiences in the
2000s leading economists to club them into one group, each has its unique history
and time path to present growth. To better understand the BRIC patterns of
growth, we start by looking deeper into their economic performance and policies
that led to their economic resurgence, one country at a time.
In Table 2, we summarize the growth rates in GDP (marked column (1)) as well
as GDP per capita (marked column (2)) in the BRIC nations since the 1960s and
compare them with that of United States and OECD countries12. A few interesting
11Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee (1998) nd that FDI improves productivity if the host country
has a su¢ cient stock of human capital. Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2011) nd that nancial
liberalization leads to growth through an increase in total factor productivity rather than capital
stock accumulation. Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Sayek (2009) nd that FDI leads to a signicant
increase in TFP in countries with well-developed nancial markets. Mitton (2006) nds that rm-
level measures of stock market liberalization leads to an improvement in rmse¢ ciency. Kose,
Prasad and Terrones (2009) nd that FDI and portfolio equity liabilities boost TFP growth while
external debt actually reduces it.
12The exception is Russia for which World Bank or Penn World Tables (PWT) data is non-
existent before the 1990s when the present Russian Federation came into existence in 1991.
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facts emerge. While Brazil and India started the 1960s closer to their US and OECD
counterparts, China faltered13. During the 1970s, while China played catch-up and
Brazil continued its economic growth, Indian growth started to decline. The tables
turned in the 1980s with Brazilian growth slowing as India made a come-back. China
continued on its path of economic growth. The 1990s saw a deep divide in each
countrys experience. Brazilian growth remained slow and Russia (for which we
have data since early 1990s) was on a decline. India and China continued growing
at a same pace as the eighties. Finally, during the last decade of 2000s, all BRIC
nations made a remarkable come-back, with China leading the pack with double-digit
economic growth.
<Table 2 about here>
In our study, we focus on the last two decades. Figure 1 presents the linearly
detrended macroeconomic variables in Brazil, China, India and Russia for our sample
period of 1990   200914: Output (Y )includes GDP and the imputed service ow
from consumer durables. It is decomposed into Consumption (C) that consists
of household consumption of non-durables and services (where the imputed service
ow from consumer durables are included) and Investment (X)that includes gross
domestic capital formation and household expenditures on consumer durables while
the residual is dened as Government Consumption (G) so that Y = C + X +
G15. Labor (L)represents total hours worked which consists of total employment
and hours worked per workers. All variables are divided by the adult population16.
Output, consumption and investment are linearly detrended by the average per adult
output growth rate over the 1990 2009 period setting 1990 at the trend level17. The
data is primarily collected from the Penn World Tables edition 7:0 and its extension
made by Duncan Foley18. The detailed sources and data construction methods are
listed in the data appendix.
<Figure 1 about here>
13Growth of per capita GDP was lower in Brazil in comparison to the developed economies, but
aggregate GDP growth was slightly higher due to the increase in population.
14The variables are plotted as log deviations from their 1990 value (1992 in case of Russia).
15Therefore, G includes government purchases of goods and services as well as net exports. The
inclusion of net exports in government consumption follows the tradition of a closed economy BCA
model (Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007)).
16We use total population for China due to data availability.
17Therefore, the output series will start at the trend level in 1990 and end at the trend level in
2009.
18Source: https://sites.google.com/a/newschool.edu/duncan-foley-homepage/home/EPWT
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2.1 Brazil
Brazil has experienced turbulent periods of boom and bust since the early 20th
century. During the late 1930s well into the 1940s, external shocks like the Great
Depression and World War II as well as internal focus on protectionism isolated
Brazilian economy from much of the developed world. However, the proactive role
of the Alliance for Progress and the Inter-American Development Bank ensured the
growth of trade and a period of economic recovery during the later 1950s and 1960s.
The government and the private sector borrowed heavily from abroad to generate this
high economic growth, which was proved unsustainable as the accumulated foreign
debt caused a debt crisis when oil prices increased in both 1974 and 1979 and the
interest rates rose in 1980 (Cardoso and Teles, 2010)19. The 1980s came to be known
as the lost decade of Brazil illustrated with low economic growth accompanied by
a decline in productivity (Graminho 2006). As the government tried to nance the
scal imbalances through seigniorage, it created high ination over the decade.
In the early 1990s, in order to turn around the stagnant economy and reduce
government debt, the government moved towards privatization of ine¢ cient state-
owned-enterprises, which increased productivity (Schmitz and Teixeira, 2008), and
output started to recover in 1993. Following the East Asian growth model, nan-
cial liberalization took place as prohibition on FDI into certain sectors was lifted
and bureaucratic obstacles were reduced (de Paula 2007). In order to contain the
ination, the government instituted the Real Plan in 1994 pegging its currency
to the US dollar. However, the xed exchange rate regime collapsed in 1999. After
the currency crisis, as a condition on the $41 billion loan received in 1998, the gov-
ernment accepted the IMF Article V III obligations which precludes members from
imposing foreign exchange restrictions. To further improve the investment climate,
2000 Fiscal Responsibility Actwas put in place, imposing severe penalties on ad-
ministrators who exceed budget limits. Federal debt was restructured, eliminating
currency-indexed bonds, reducing ination-indexed debt and increasing xed-rate
proportion. These measures upgraded Brazils investment grade status (BNY Mel-
lon). While net inows of FDI slowed down after the crisis, their percentage to GDP
averaged 2:7% during the 2000s, almost doubling over the previous decades.
A virtuous cycle of BRIC emergence helped Brazil during the 2000s as growing
China increased its demand for commodities, of which Brazil had a comparative
advantage. As reported by ISI Emerging Markets Brazils exports to China grew
by a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 46:9% annually while imports from
China grew by a CAGR of 37:8% annually from 1999 to 2010. The growth rates are
high compared to its aggregate exports and imports which saw a CAGR of 12:7%
and 11:5% respectively. By 2009, growth in Brazil-China trade catapulted China
19While average annual growth rate of exports of goods and services stood at 10:5% during the
later 1970s and early 1980s, the growth rate dropped to 5:3% in mid to late 1980s and early 1990s.
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as Brazils largest trade partner, overtaking the United States. China presently
accounts for 14:7% of Brazils total trade ows. Overall average annual growth rate
of exports increased to 7:13% almost catching up with the pre-1980s numbers.
2.2 Russia
The political disintegration of the erstwhile Soviet Block in 1991 and formation of
the Russian Federation makes Russia a unique country for our analysis. Since the
economic and political movements of the earlier Soviet Union are too vast to concisely
summarize in our paper, we begin our discussion by an analysis of the newly found
Russian Federation. After the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, the world saw
a transition of yet another socialistic economy to a more market based economic
structure. President Boris Yelstin, who took the reins of the new country, vowed
radical, market-oriented reforms, referred to as a shock therapy for its abrupt
nature.
Russias initial experience with market economy did not go smoothly as hyperin-
ation coupled with unsustainable government budget decits prevailed during the
1990s. In addition, political unrest due to the emergence of oligarchs who now came
to control the vast earlier state-owned enterprises bred discontent while the war in
Chechnya did not help matters. The failure of exchange rate-based stabilization in
1995 and disappointing macroeconomic performance eventually led to the Russian
Financial Crisis in 1998 (Merlevede, Schoors and Van Aarle 2009). When the Asian
Financial Crisis led to a decline in the demand for crude oil (one of Russias biggest
exports), the economy was further hit and growth numbers turned negative. Annual
growth rate of exports fell to the tune of 1:8%, while aggregate GDP growth fell by
4:8% (per capita GDP fell by 4:9%), requiring a $22:6 billion bailout from IMF and
World Bank. To stabilize Russia, leaders of the G  8 also agreed to explore ways to
write-o¤ the old Soviet debt that Russia had assumed. Government of Russia also
took pro-active steps to curtail the e¤ects of a sudden decline in oil prices- a hard
lesson learned during the East Asian Crisis- with the set-up of the Oil Stabilization
Fund of Russian Federation in 2004.
After surviving the political turmoil of early 1990s and the 1998 crisis, Russia too
instituted strong reforms outlined in two resolutions: (a) Measures Planned by the
Government of the Russian Federation and the Central Bank of the Russian Federa-
tion to Stabilize Socioeconomic Conditions in Russia (Nov 16; 1998) and (b) Letter
of Development Policy for the Third Structural Adjustment Loan (July 19; 1999).
While the rst plan was more consistent with Russian system of state control, the
second plan was formulated after consultations with international nancial institu-
tions. In a move towards privatization, 15 companies were identied to be privatized
by early 2000s. The government also lifted the January 1999 moratorium on insol-
vency claims of companies, encouraging private investment. However, on the trade
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front, government re-introduced export tari¤s and quotas in a bid to reign in Russian
over-dependence on international trade.
President Vladimir Putin, who succeeded Boris Yelstin, spearheaded a concerted
e¤ort to revamp infrastructure and increase production, both industrial and agrarian.
The Oil Stabilization Fund played a crucial role in maintaining the scal surplus
through the oil revenue. According to de Paula (2007), some exibility in the scal
policy was introduced in 2006 with the creation of an Investment Fund in the federal
budget. The aim of the fund is to nance infrastructure investment and innovation
related projects in joint public-private partnerships. The recent 2008 global crisis
hit Russia comparatively harder than its BRIC peers due to Russian dependence on
crude oil and commodities trade for its economy20. However, the recovery was also
swift as output growth turned positive in mid-2009, and by 2010, GDP growth rate
reached 4:0%, after a negative growth of  7:8% in 2009 (GDP per capita growth
rates are comparable).
2.3 India
After emerging from its colonial era in 1947, India embarked on a socialistic develop-
ment path by successive formulation of the "Five Year Plans" of economic growth.
The central tenets of the growth plans were an emphasis on the public sector, strong
move towards licensing and import restrictions and agrarian development. After
a relative slowdown in the 1970s, reform measures in India started in the 1980s,
with a move towards de-licensing and infrastructural investment accompanied by a
pro-business attitude (Bosworth and Collins, 2008 ; Rodrik and Subramanian, 2005).
India faced a serious crisis in 1991 during the rst gulf war and was at the verge
of defaulting on its domestic loans reaching a crisis point in terms of foreign exchange
reserves. India asked for a $1:8 billion bailout loan from the IMF, which in return
demanded reforms. The reforms since then, initiated by the then Finance Minister
(current Prime Minister) of India, Dr. Manmohan Singh, was a complete reversal
of the earlier era of socialistic growth. Following the East Asian model, India ini-
tiated a two-pronged reform approach: major macroeconomic management reforms
and structural and sector specic economic reforms. India started widespread priva-
tization and nancial liberalization, de-licensing the License Rajand encouraging
foreign direct investment in many major industries. Subsidies to agriculture (par-
ticularly fertilizer and food) was reduced to narrow the budget decit. Taxes were
lowered, export subsidies were abolished and import tari¤s were reduced. India initi-
ated the formation of special economic zones, with a gradual liberalizing of organized
manufacturing sector. India continues its liberalization e¤ort initiating a move to-
20The ruble fell 35% against the dollar from the onset of the crisis to January 2009, as the foreign
exchange reserves fell by $210 billion.
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wards foreign direct investment in retail sector (which is still to pass muster with
all political parties) and setting up of agro-economic zones to encourage agricultural
exports.
These moves catapulted India in the last decade into the elite group of top ten na-
tions, primarily aided by a strong service sector and information technology industry.
According to Bollard, Klenow and Sharma (2012), manufacturing TFP growth in In-
dia saw substantial speedup at over 5 percentage points per year during 1993  2007
as opposed to the previous decade. While its economic transition was threatened
during the current global crisis, India weathered the 2008 crisis well, as seems to be
true of most BRIC nations. While average output growth did slow down to 7:0%
during 2008   2009, since then it has recovered to 9:0% , with a per capita GDP
growth of 7:4%21. For the rst time in decades, average annual growth rate of Indian
exports crossed the double digit mark, reaching 14:4% during the last decade, as
opposed to an average increase of 7:6% during the previous decades. The same trend
was evident in inows of foreign direct investment that totaled 1:6% of GDP during
the 2000s as compared to an average of 0:15% of GDP during the previous decade22.
2.4 China
China is one of the classical growth stories of development economics. Primarily
formed as a communist country after the 1949 revolution by its patriarch, Mao
Zedong, China yielded minimal economic power till the late 1970s and was known
as a slow growth, tightly reined communist nation. During this period, the Chinese
trade policy was focused on import substitution. The government protected the steel
and machinery industries from foreign competition by controlling imports and foreign
exchange transactions. Trade was limited to the Central Foreign Trade Ministry and
its twelve trade corporations. These trade corporations exported agricultural and
primary goods in order to nance the controlled imports of industrial equipment.
In late 1970s Deng Xiaoping introduced theGaige Kaifang (Reform and Opening-
up) policy. Since then the Government of China has pursued aggressively a pro-
reform, market-oriented growth agenda, making China one of the most successful
examples of state led capitalism today. 1978 marked the year when China started
allowing foreign direct investment into special economic zones that became con-
duits for growth while dramatically increasing the number of rms that are allowed
to engage in foreign trade. Since 1984, economic reforms picked up in earnest with
a decline in government intervention, coupled with increases in decentralization and
21As reported by the World Development Indicators, at its worst in 2008, output growth declined
to 4:9% before recovering.
22The growth in exports started in the 1990s in response to privatization and liberalization and
exports grew by almost 12% in the mid to late 1990s. However, inows of FDI did not pick up till
the 2000s.
12
privatization of the state sector. Gradually through the 1980s, China started adopt-
ing an export-oriented growth model.
While the 1990s was a period of political volatility and the East Asian Crisis
that a¤ected Chinese growth to some extent, China continued on the reform process.
In 1996 China accepted the IMF Article V II, that resulted in the liberalization of
foreign exchange controls related to current account transactions(de Paula 2007).
China entered a new era in December 2001 by joining the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) and agreeing to a host of globalization measures. Import quotas were
removed and tari¤s were gradually reduced. Production and exports shifted toward
labor-intensive goods while imports of consumer durables and investment goods in-
creased dramatically. Institutional changes were also apparent since the Chinese
Communist Partys meeting in 2003 that encouraged protection of property rights
and massive public investment in infrastructure development that would further en-
courage foreign investment. The liberalization policies were successful and by 2005,
domestic private sector accounted for more than 50% of Chinese GDP. The e¤orts
have borne fruit and during the rst half of the last decade, the average growth rate
of GDP has averaged roughly 10%- the highest in the world.
The Chinese government, as its BRIC counterparts, was also well equipped to
deal with the global crisis. China announced a stimulus package to the tune of RMB
4 trillion (approximately US $586 billion) that would be used for public investment.
In addition, China is turning from export dependence to home market to keep up
growth. Given Chinas success in stemming the crisis from a¤ecting its economy,
World Bank revised its estimate of Chinese growth forecast from 6:5% to 7:3% in
2010. China was successful in attaining an actual GDP growth rate of 10:4% (per
capita GDP growth rate of 9:83% - World Bank estimates). For its part, exports
still played a very important role in Chinese growth with average annual exports
growing by almost 20% during the 2000s, ably aided by an equally robust growth in
FDI inows that reached almost 4% of Chinese GDP, and was the largest amongst
the BRIC nations23.
3 The Model
In this section, we describe a standard, closed economy BCA model with a repre-
sentative household, rm and a government. The representative rm hires labor
23Chinese dominance in terms of its export growth and ability to lure FDI preceded that of India
and in terms of timing was closer to Brazils resurgence. Both China and Brazil saw an uptick in
export growth and inows of FDI in the 1990s. It took another decade for India to follow in the
same path. As for Russia, we only have numbers for the last two decades, and it certainly seems
to be the case that the Russian resurgence also happened in the last decade, following a time-line
similar to India.
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and capital from the household to produce output using a constant returns to scale
technology, which is a¤ected by time-varying production e¢ ciency. The represen-
tative household decides on consumption, labor and investment each period. The
household faces a budget constraint where its expenditure is limited by its labor and
capital income. In addition, as the ultimate owner of the rm, the consumer receives
the prots. The consumer pays distortionary taxes on labor and capital income to
the government. In the BCA framework, these distortionary taxes represent broader
economic distortions that a¤ect the factor markets. The government uses its tax rev-
enue to nance government consumption. Any remaining amount is transferred back
to the households as lump sum transfers. Exogenous shocks to production e¢ ciency,
government consumption and distortionary tax rates are revealed in the beginning
of each period and a¤ect economic incentives.
3.1 Firm
The representative rm borrows capital Kt and labor Lt from the household in order
to produce output Yt according to a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt = K

t (AtLt)
1 ;
where At denotes exogenous production e¢ ciency. Labor is dened as total hours
worked (product of employment and hours worked per worker).
Productivity can be divided into a trend component  t and a cyclical component
t, i.e. At = t t, where we assume a constant growth rate in the trend component:
 t
 t 1
= a:
Labor grows over time due to growth in population Nt where we assume a constant
growth rate in population:
Nt
Nt 1
= n:
Output and capital grows over time due to both population and productivity growth.
All variables are detrended by the growth trends in order to dene a stationary
problem:
yt =
Yt
Nt t
; kt =
Kt
Nt t
; lt =
Lt
Nt
; t =
At
 t
:
Firms maximize prots t:
maxt = yt   rtkt   wtlt (1)
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where rt and wt denote the real return on capital and the real wage respectively. The
detrended production function can be rewritten as
yt = k

t (tlt)
1 : (2)
For the benchmark model, we follow CKM (2007) and dene the e¢ ciency wedges
as
!e;t = t: (3)
3.2 The Household and Government
The representative household gains utility from consumption ct and leisure 1   lt
where we assume a log-linear utility function for our analysis:
u(ct; 1  lt) = 	 ln ct + (1 	) ln(1  lt):
Total hours available is normalized to one24.
The household maximizes its expected lifetime utility:
maxEt
P
t
t [u(ct; 1  lt)] ;
where  is the subjective discount factor. The household budget constraint is
(1   l;t)wtlt + (1   k;t) rtkt + t +  t = ct + xt; (4)
where  lt and  kt are distortionary labor and capital income taxes while  t is the
lump-sum government transfers. Investment xt is dened by the capital accumulation
law:
nakt+1 = xt + (1  )kt: (5)
The government collects distortionary taxes from the household in order to -
nance government consumption while the remainder is transferred to the household
in a lump-sum fashion. Therefore, the government budget constraint is
gt +  t =  ltwtlt +  ktrtkt: (6)
24We assume the maximum work week as 14 7 = 98 and normalize hours worked per worker ht
as
ht =
average work week
98
which is bounded between 0 and 1. Therefore, the detrended labor
lt =
average work week
98
total employment
total population
is also bounded between 0 and 1.
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Combining the government budget constraint (6) and the household budget con-
straint (4) making use of the denition of prots (1), we obtain the resource con-
straint
yt = ct + xt + gt: (7)
Labor and investment wedges f!l;t; !k;tg are dened as:
!l;t = 1   lt
!k;t = 1   kt
Technically speaking, !l;t drives a wedge between the consumption-leisure marginal
rate of substitution and the marginal product of labor while !k;t drives a wedge
between the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution and the marginal return
on investment. For convenience, we dene government consumption wedges as the
deviation of government purchases from its steady state level:
!g;t =
gt
g
: (8)
3.3 Wedges
We dene the e¢ ciency, government consumption, investment and labor wedges
!t = (!e;t; !g;t; !k;t; !l;t)
0 such that an increase in each wedge should lead to an
increase in output. Increases in e¢ ciency wedge directly increases production and
stimulates factor demand by increasing the marginal product of inputs. On the other
hand, increases in labor and investment wedges stimulate output by encouraging the
household to increase supply of factor inputs through an increase in the marginal
income associated with them. Therefore we refer to increases in e¢ ciency, invest-
ment and labor wedges as improvements. High government consumption wedges
should also increase output due to the increase in aggregate demand. However, we
do not call an increase in government consumption as an improvementsince this is
associated with the crowding-out of household consumption and investment, which
leads to household welfare deterioration.
Following CKM (2007), we assume that the wedges are exogenous and follow a sto-
chastic process. Dening a vector of log-linearized wedges, e!t = (g!e;t;g!g;t;g!k;t; f!l;t)0
where e!t = ln!t  ln!, we assume that the wedges follow a rst order VAR process:e!t = Pg!t 1 + "t (9)
"t  N(0; V )
where "t = ("e;t; "g;t; "k;t; "l;t)
0 are innovations to the wedges. Following CKM (2007)
we allow spill-over of wedges through P and contemporaneous correlations of inno-
vations in V .
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3.4 Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is given by a price vector frt; wtg and an allocation
of quantities fyt; ct; xt; lt; kt; zt; gt;  t; !e;t; !g;t; !k;t; !l;tg such that: (a) the household
maximizes utility given frt; wt;  t; !k;t; !l;tg; (b) the rm maximizes prots given
frt; wt; ztg; (c) the government budget constraint (6) and the resource constraint (7)
holds; and (d) the wedges follow the stochastic process (9).
The competitive equilibrium is characterized by a set of rst-order conditions
given by: (a) the Euler equation (rst order condition with respect to capital) equal-
izing present discounted value of marginal utility of future consumption to its mar-
ginal cost:
1
ct
=

na
Et

1
ct+1

!k;t+1
yt+1
kt+1
+ 1  

; (10)
(b) the rst-order equation with respect to labor equating marginal rate of substitu-
tion between consumption and leisure to the marginal product of labor:
1 	
	
ct
1  lt = !l;t(1  )
yt
lt
; (11)
(c) the resource constraint (7) given (8), (d) the capital law of motion (5), and (e)
the production function (2) given (3).
4 Quantitative Analysis
4.1 Parameter Values
We now discuss the implementation of the BCA method. For each country, we
rst obtain the parameters of the model through usual calibration techniques. For
calibration purposes, we assume that there are no distortions in the steady state
so that ! = f1; 1; 1; 1g. Capital share  is calibrated to match the income share
of capital derived from data. The productivity growth trend a is computed as the
average growth rate of per capita output. Population growth trend n is directly
computed from adult population data25. We construct the total capital stock series
as the sum of net xed capital stock and household durables in order to compute the
total annual depreciation rate . The subjective discount factor  is calibrated using
the steady state capital Euler equation (10) to match steady state capital-output
ratio given the productivity growth trend a, population growth n, capital share 
and the depreciation rate . The preference weight 	 is calibrated using the steady
state labor rst order condition (11) given the capital share , to match the steady
25We used total population for China since we do not have adult population data.
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state consumption-output ratio and the steady state labor. The values are listed in
Table 3.
Once we have the calibrated parameters, the next step is to estimate the stochastic
process of the wedges (9) for which we employ the Bayesian techniques. Structural
estimation is necessary for the business cycle accounting procedure since investment
wedges are dened in the intertemporal equilibrium condition (10) that depends on
expectations about the future state of the economy which is not directly observable.
The estimated parameters are the lag parameters in P , the standard deviation of
the errors, and the cross-correlations between the errors in V . Since there are 4
exogenous variables, we use the time series data of output, consumption, investment
and labor as observable variables. The Bayesian priors and the parameters of the
vector and the point estimates of these parameters are listed in the appendix.
4.2 Simulation
The rst step in the simulation process is to solve the model for linear decision rules
for linearized endogenous variables gkt+1 and eqt = (eyt; ect; ext; elt)0 :gkt+1 = Aekt +B e!t;eqt = C ekt +D e!t:
Note that the entire series of ekt can be directly generated from the equation (assuming
an initial value ek0 = 0):
gkt+1 = x
nak
ext + 1  
na
ekt;
and the observed series of investment. Then the wedges can be computed as
e!t = D 1 eqt   C ekt :
Once the wedges are computed, they are used for simulation. We compute the
endogenous reaction of selected variables to the changes in a chosen wedge f!j;t by
plugging its time series into the linear decision rules of endogenous variables:
gk!jt+1 = Afk!jt +Bf!j;t;fq!jt = Cfk!jt +Df!j;t:
By denition, plugging in all wedges into the model will exactly reproduce the ob-
servable data: eq!t = C ekt +D e!t = C ekt +DD 1 eqt   C ekt = eqt:
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Therefore, we can easily decompose the e¤ects of each wedges on the observables due
to linearity of the decision rules:fq!et + fq!gt + fq!kt + fq!lt = eq!t :
4.3 Results
Figure 2 plots the time paths of output and computed wedges for each country. In
reporting our results, we show the log deviations of the variables with respect to the
steady state (where the rst year of data availability is taken as the steady state).
<Figure 2 about here>
For the most part, we do not nd much commonality in wedge movements in the
four nations. For example, while e¢ ciency wedges have been above the trend in Brazil
and Russia throughout the entire period, it has been below trend for most of the
time in India and China. In Brazil, there was a temporary slow down in the growth
of e¢ ciency during 1997   2003. In Russia, it took o¤ in 1998 and kept growing
at an enormous rate, suggesting a positive impact of e¢ ciency on growth. In India,
while e¢ ciency wedges temporarily improved in 2005, since then it has suddenly
collapsed. In China, while e¢ ciency wedges deteriorated during the 1995   2001
period, it shows a gradually improvement ever since. It is hard to nd common
patterns in government consumption wedges and labor wedges as well. In Brazil,
India and China, while government consumption wedges have declined during the
1990s, since then in Brazil and China they recovered rapidly and gone above the
trend level, but not so in India. In Russia, government consumption wedges increase
dramatically in the late 1990s, a foil to the other three nations, and gradually return
to the trend level. As for the labor wedges, in Brazil, they deteriorate during the
1990s and remain below trend throughout the 2000s while in Russia, they are rising
throughout the entire period. In India, they are relatively stagnant during the 1990s
and slightly deteriorate throughout the 2000s. In China, the performance is worse
and they deteriorate throughout the entire period.
Perhaps the common thread amongst all four nations is the evolution of invest-
ment wedges in the last decade. Investment wedges have been below the trend in
Brazil and Russia and above trend in India and China throughout the entire period.
However, they show improvements in all countries during the 2000s, a common factor
in an otherwise diverse experience of the BRICs. This suggests that improvements
in investment market frictions potentially aided the resurgence of BRICs since the
mid-2000s.
<Table 4 about here>
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In Table 4, we report the standard deviation of wedges with respect to output
and the correlations of wedges with output for various leads and lags26 to ascertain
various comovements. A positive correlation indicates a positive association between
a given wedge and the observed economic outcome, and vice versa. E¢ ciency wedges,
for the most part, are positively correlated with output in all countries except India,
where the correlation turns negative contemporaneously and for the leads +1 and
+2: Investment wedges also show a positive correlation with output in all countries,
indicating a positive contribution of investment wedge to output. Labor wedges
are positively correlated with output in Brazil and Russia, but negatively correlated
in India. In China, while labor wedges become positively correlated for contempo-
raneous periods and leads +1, +2, the magnitude remains low. As for government
consumption wedges, while they are positively correlated with output in Brazil (with
the exception of the leads+1, +2); in India, and China, they are negatively correlated
with output in Russia for all leads and lags.
Given our wedges, we next feed them one by one in our benchmark model and
simulate output. Table 5 presents the decomposition of the impact of each wedges
on output and the investment to output ratio. We dene a contribution indicator of
each wedge !j on an endogenous variable v as:
contj = corr(
fv!jt ; evt)  std(fv!jt )std(evt)
=
cov(fv!jt ; evt)
var(evt) :
Due to linearity, X
j
contj = 1;
as described in Otsu (2010b). Therefore, we can consider the value of the indicator
as the contribution of each wedge to the uctuation of the variable of interest.
4.3.1 Output
First, we provide the simulation results for output in Table 5a. Since the economies
grew particularly rapidly since 2000, we also specically discuss the period 2000 to
2009. Figure 3a plots the simulation results of each wedge on output for each
country.
26As dened in CKM (2007), a "k   th lag" is the correlation between the t  k th value of the
variable of interest with output at period t.
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<Table 5a about here>
<Figure 3a about here>
In Brazil, e¢ ciency, investment and labor wedges all contribute signicantly to
the output uctuation over the entire period with e¢ ciency, investment and labor
wedges explaining 29:3%, 36:8%, and 49:0% of output respectively. E¢ ciency wedges
are particularly signicant in accounting for growth in the 2000s with a contribution
of 93:2%, while the contributions of investment and labor wedges, though positive,
are much lower. As the gure depicts, the model with only e¢ ciency wedges while
capturing the short run output uctuation quite well, predicts a much higher output
level throughout the entire period than witnessed in the data. By 2009, the model
predicts output to be 13 percentage points above the trend. The growth in output
that would have materialized with e¢ ciency wedges alone are tempered by govern-
ment consumption wedge. Investment and labor wedges for their part account for
the sub-par economic performance of the 1990s, but they do marginally contribute
to the recovery of the 2000s.
In Russia, during the overall sample period, e¢ ciency wedges have a contribution
higher than 100% while all other wedges have negative contributions. According to
the gure, this is because the model with only e¢ ciency wedges predicts the economy
to recover much faster from the recession in the 1990s and grow much faster in the
2000s than it actually did. On the other hand, investment wedges predict a decline
in output throughout the entire period. Therefore, investment wedges contribute to
the downturn in 1990s while e¢ ciency wedges aid Russia in recuperating much of
the output loss in the 1990s to get back on the development track.
In India, investment wedges contribute the most to the uctuation of output with
an overall contribution of 87:4% over the entire period. This is mainly because of
the 2000s where the contribution of investment wedge rises to 105:4%. Interestingly,
during the 1990s the contribution of e¢ ciency wedge at 79:6% was much higher
than that of the investment wedge at 26:5%. When we run the model with only
e¢ ciency wedge, it performs quite well in predicting the uctuation in output until
2005 . However, it fails to predict the rapid growth after 2005. This is where the
investment wedge comes in and investment wedges alone do a better job of accounting
for the rapid acceleration of Indian growth during the 2000s well to the sample end
(refer to Figure 6 panel A and C for a clearer depiction of this phenomenon).
China presents a similar picture with e¢ ciency wedges being the most important
force in accounting for the output movement with a contribution of 72:6%. How-
ever, during the 2000s the contribution of investment wedges, 72:0%, becomes larger
than that of e¢ ciency wedges, 41:5%. According to the gure, the model with only
e¢ ciency wedges can almost perfectly reproduce the output uctuations until 2004.
However, mirroring the experience of India, it fails to account for the further rapid
growth after 2004. On the other hand, investment wedges have signicant impacts
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on output uctuation throughout the entire 2000s till the end of the sample period,
much like in India.
The unique experience of each country nevertheless show some common patterns,
particularly in the last decade. While Brazilian and Russian growth was facilitated
primarily by improvements in production e¢ ciency (Brazil also benetting to some
extent from decline in investment market frictions), India and China grew primarily
as a result of decline in investment market frictions, particularly in the later half of the
2000s, though, to some extent, China also benetted from e¢ ciency improvements
as it did not experience the sudden loss of productive e¢ ciency as India did since
2005. The contribution of labor and government consumption wedges to growth is
negligible in all four nations.
4.3.2 Investment-Output Ratio
Next, to investigate the contribution of wedges to capital accumulation, which we
conjecture is an important avenue of growth, we simulate the investment-output ratio
in each country27. The time series of the simulations are plotted in Figure 3b while
the decompositions are presented in Table 5b.
<Table 5b about here>
<Figure 3b about here>
The results suggest that investment-output ratio in Brazil is primarily explained
by the investment wedge whose contribution is 69:4%. Government wedges are also
important, particularly during the 2000s with a contribution of 31:7%. E¢ ciency and
labor wedges (during the 2000s) do not seem to play important roles in accounting
for the investment-output ratio.
In Russia, investment and government wedges account for most of the uctuation
in the investment-output ratio over the entire period with contributions of 67:6% and
48:5% respectively. In fact, the contributions of both wedges increase to 158:1% and
78:5% in the 2000s respectively. The dramatic increase in government consumption
wedges during the 1990s crowds out private investment, which leads to a decline in
the overall investment-output ratio. Interestingly, while government wedges are still
above trend during the 2000s, the investment-output ratio gradually increases since
the cumulative decline in capital stock from the past decade hinders output growth,
explaining the positive coe¢ cient.
The decline in the investment-output ratio in response to the continuously grow-
ing e¢ ciency wedge during the 2000s might seem puzzling at rst (contribution
27Since ours is a closed economy model, the investment-output ratio is equivalent to the savings
rate.
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indicator of e¢ ciency wedge being  1:05) as at the rst glance, an increase in e¢ -
ciency wedge tends to increase investment more than output, resulting in an increase
in investment-output ratio. The reason for this negative association is that as the
e¢ ciency wedge continuously improves over the decade, capital stock continuously
accumulates due to increased investment which facilitates an increase in output while
suppressing investment due to diminishing marginal product of capital.
In India, investment wedges account for 80:2% of the uctuation of the investment-
output ratio over the entire period. In the 1990s, however, investment wedges have
the lowest contribution amongst all wedges at 14:7%. The other wedges, namely,
e¢ ciency, labor and government wedges, account for 37:4%, 26:5% and 21:3% of
the investment-output ratio uctuation respectively. The importance of investment
wedges emerges in the 2000s when the rise in investment-output ratio can be at-
tributed solely to the investment wedges, mirroring the previous sections result of
the increasing importance of investment wedges in accounting for Indian economic
growth in the 2000s.
A similar picture emerges for China where the investment-output ratio is mainly
accounted for by investment wedges whose contribution is 69:8% over the entire
period and 112:9% during the 2000s. The deterioration of labor wedge depresses
output (the denominator) throughout the entire period, resulting in a growth in the
investment-output ratio itself, which explains the signicant 27:7% contribution of
labor wedges to its overall changes. As for the government consumption wedges,
during the 1990s the contribution is signicant at 31:2% but it turns negative dur-
ing the 2000s: On the other hand, the contribution of the e¢ ciency wedge on the
investment-output ratio is marginal.
The improvement of investment wedges is clearly a major contributor to the
growth in investment-output ratio during the 2000s in all countries. In particular,
the importance of investment wedges in accounting for the output in India and China
in the 2000s and its continued importance in accounting for the investment-output
ratio suggests that the investment wedges during the 2000s in India and China led
to their rapid growth through capital accumulation.
One possible policy initiative widely adopted in the BRIC nations was nancial
liberalization that might have resulted in a decline in investment-nancing frictions,
encouraging both foreign and domestic investment and might be a candidate in
explaining the increased importance of investment wedges in the 2000s.
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5 Sensitivity Analysis
5.1 Test 1: E¢ ciency Wedges as Productivity Growth
In CKM (2007) e¢ ciency wedges are dened as temporary shocks to productivity.
However, shocks to productivity might be permanent rather than temporary. Recall
that in Figure 1, detrended output had fallen during the 1990s and then rapidly
surged during the 2000s in all BRICs nations. In order to illustrate these medium
term cycles better, it might be more appropriate to model e¢ ciency wedges as shocks
to the trend component of productivity rather than the cyclical component as sug-
gested by Aguiar and Gopinath (2007). In this section, we alter the denition of
e¢ ciency wedges and compare the results to those in the benchmark model.
5.1.1 Model II
The only alteration we make from the benchmark model is the denition of e¢ -
ciency wedges (3). First, we consider e¢ ciency wedges as the growth in productivity
between the previous period (t  1) and the current period (t):
!e;t =
t
t 1
:
We call this setting as model II. In model II, the realization of current productivity
will dene the growth of productivity and agents will anticipate the growth to grad-
ually return to its trend rate according to (9). Therefore, the income e¤ect caused
by e¢ ciency wedges should be stronger than that in the benchmark model.
5.1.2 Model III
An alternative way to model e¢ ciency wedges as productivity growth is to assume
that current e¢ ciency wedges lead to a growth in productivity between the current
period (t) and future period (t+ 1):
!e;t =
t+1
t
:
We denote this setting as model III. In this model, the agents know the one-period-
ahead productivity level when they make decisions on current choice variables. Also,
as in model II, the agents will consider e¢ ciency wedges as permanent shocks.
5.1.3 Simulation
Model II and Model III are estimated and simulated in a similar fashion as the pro-
totype model. One important modication is that since we are dening e¢ ciency
24
wedges as shocks to the growth of productivity, we have to dene the productiv-
ity level as an endogenous state variable. The linear decision rules of endogenous
variables are:
gst+1 = Aest +B e!t;eqt = C est +D e!t;
where we dene the endogenous state variables est = ekt;fAt. The entire series of ekt
and fAt can be directly computed from
gkt+1 = x
nak
ext + 1  
na
ekt;
fAt = eyt
1    
ekt
1    
elt;
assuming initial values ek0 = 0, fA0 = 0. Then the wedges can be computed as
e!t = D 1 (eqt   C est) :
Simulation is carried out in the same fashion as the benchmark model:gs!jt+1 = Afs!jt +Bf!j;t;fq!jt = Cfs!jt +Df!j;t:
5.1.4 Results
Since the growth shocks introduced in this section a¤ects the expectations of the
future, not only e¢ ciency wedges but also investment wedges, that depend on ex-
pectations about future, are a¤ected. The labor and government wedges are exactly
the same as in the benchmark model. Figure 4 plots the e¢ ciency and investment
wedges in the benchmark model, Model II and Model III.
<Figure 4 about here>
By denition, e¢ ciency wedges are equivalent to productivity in the benchmark
model; productivity growth in model II; and future productivity growth in model
III. Therefore, when the e¢ ciency wedges in model II are positive, those in the
benchmark model are growing. The e¢ ciency wedges in model III are simply those
in model II shifted one period ahead.
Since investment wedges are dened in the capital Euler equation (10) which
is an expectational equation, when the denition of e¢ ciency wedges changes the
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expectation structure will also change. That is, in the benchmark model agents
anticipate productivity to return to its steady state level whereas in model II and
III agents believe that there is a shift in the steady state level. Therefore, the
expected value of the variables in the right hand side will be a¤ected and hence the
investment wedges. The extent to which this a¤ects the investment wedges depends
not only on the steady state parameter values but also the estimated parameters in
the stochastic process. Thus, there is no systematic relationship between the three
di¤erent investment wedges series.
As in the benchmark model, we decompose the e¤ects of the wedges under models
II and III on output in Table 6 and plot the simulation results in Figure 5.
<Table 6 about here>
<Figure 5 about here>
The simulation results under the alternative models turn out to be similar to those
in the benchmark model for the most part. In Brazil, under both the alternative
specications, investment and labor wedges account for the stagnation in the 1990s
while e¢ ciency wedges are important in accounting for the rapid growth in the 2000s.
In Russia, investment wedges cause the downturn during the 1990s while e¢ ciency
wedges salvage the economy in the 2000s. In India, e¢ ciency wedges account for
the output uctuations up to the mid-2000s while investment wedges are important
in accounting for the rapid growth in the later 2000s. In China, e¢ ciency wedges
play a very important role in accounting for output uctuations in both decades.
The contribution of investment wedges during the 2000s for model II and III, 35:8%
and 20:6% respectively, are considerably lower compared to that in the benchmark
model, 72:0%. Government consumption wedges have higher contribution than in
the benchmark model to compensate for this. Nonetheless, investment wedges still
play an important role in the rapid growth during the later 2000s:
It is important to note that the quantitative impact of the e¢ ciency wedges are
quite similar across the three models. Intuitively speaking, changing the denition
of e¢ ciency wedges does not change the realizations of productivity At but it a¤ects
the expectations on future productivity. The result that the e¤ects of e¢ ciency
wedges on output are robust across the three models indicates that the e¤ects of the
realization of productivity is more important than the expectations they generate.
5.2 Test 2: Benchmark Model with Investment Adjust-
ment Costs
In the benchmark model capital stock is accumulated following the capital law of
motion (5). However, as CKM (2007) argues, investment adjustment costs can reect
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costs in converting output to capital in a detailed model, or nancial frictions can
manifest themselves as investment adjustment costs in a prototype RBC model. How
does this modication a¤ect our results?
The only equation that changes is the capital accumulation equation:
nakt+1 = xt + (1  )kt   

xt
kt

kt
where


xt
kt

=

2

xt
kt
  
2
:
The constant  is set at  = na  (1  ) so that the adjustment cost is equal to zero
in the steady state. The parameter  is calibrated to match the marginal Tobins Q
to one:
d log q
d log (x=k)
= 1;
where q is the e¤ective price of investment relative to consumption:
q =
1
1  0 :
This leads to  = k
x
:
We plot the simulations of output under each of the four wedges in Figure 6 (we
also plot the results of the benchmark model for comparison). Output decompositions
are presented in Table 7.
<Table 7 about here>
<Figure 6 about here>
Our primary results do not change. E¢ ciency, investment and labor wedges still
account for most of output uctuations in Brazil with e¢ ciency wedges accounting
almost wholly for the growth in 2000s. E¢ ciency wedge, once again, emerges as the
most important factor in accounting for Russian resurgence in 2000s while investment
wedge can account for the output drop in the 1990s. In India, while e¢ ciency wedge
itself still predicts a decline in output as opposed to data, investment wedge once
again accounts for a major portion of output increase. However, in the model with
investment adjustment costs, government consumption wedge as well as labor wedge
account for a greater magnitude of output uctuation in India as compared to the
benchmark. In China, once again, output uctuations are accounted for mostly by
e¢ ciency and investment wedges. Government consumption wedge plays a role in the
2000s, but it is smaller than the role played by e¢ ciency and particularly investment
wedge.
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The diagram on Panel A and C also makes it clearer that in India and China,
while e¢ ciency wedges perform quite well till about mid-2000s in accounting for
output, it fails to account for the sharp increase in output thereafter and this is
where investment wedge comes in handy. This pattern does not change even with a
greater contribution of other wedges in the 2000s as compared to benchmark.
6 Decomposition, Wedges and Policies
While the experience of each BRIC nation has been unique, the underlying common-
ality seems to be the importance of e¢ ciency or investment wedge (and sometimes
both) as two of the most important channels accounting for output uctuations in
the BRIC nations. In this section, we take a look at some policy changes and institu-
tional reforms that could potentially shed further light on movement of these wedges.
Our discussion mainly focuses on the 2000s due to data availability. Analytically, it
works for us since it is the 2000s when we witness a sharp turnaround in growth of
the BRIC nations.
<Figure 7a about here>
The wedge diagnostics point to an important role of nancial liberalization and
to some extent, institutional reforms, along some particular dimensions.
As discussed earlier in section 2, the BRIC nations undertook widespread reforms
to encourage nancial liberalization and opening up of the markets. In order to
quantify the e¤ects of these reforms, we focus on the evolution of credit ows in the
BRIC nations. Figure 7A plots the private credit share in GDP and the net FDI
inow to GDP ratio. All BRIC nations saw an increase in the ow of credit to private
sector, where China outpaced the other nations28. FDI inow also increased in all
countries since the early 1990s when o¢ cial steps to encourage liberalization were
taken29. The growing trend in FDI continued till 2008 when there was a decline as a
result of the global downturn. Interestingly, domestic credit to the private sector did
not show any such decline, even though the BRIC nations su¤ered to some extent
during the recent global crisis. Overall, nancial liberalization seems to have boosted
the ow of capital towards and within the BRIC nations.
Financial liberalization and the resulting development in the nancial market is
consistent with the observed improvement in investment wedges in our model. When
investment wedges are low, the expected return on investment is high relative to the
28The hike in Brazilian domestic credit in the early 1990s corresponds to the hyperination period
caused by seniorage.
29FDI inow to Brazil and China as a share of GDP fell slightly in the early 2000s, but quickly
bounced back.
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intertemporal marginal rate of substitution as shown in (10). This can be caused by
investment market distortions such as interest rate controls or capital controls which
hampers the e¢ cient ow of capital from the households to the rms. Financial
liberalization increases the availability of capital by removing these distortions and
enables rms to seize protable investment opportunities. As a result, investment
rises which brings down the expected return on investment due to diminishing mar-
ginal product of capital. Therefore, the gap between the intertemporal marginal rate
of substitution and the expected return on capital should shrink.
<Figure 7B about here>
Increased capital ows suggest an improvement in credit worthiness borne out
by the nancial market indicators (Figure 7B) provided by the IMD World Com-
petitiveness Yearbook (henceforth, WCY). The rst panel shows the credit rating
of the BRIC countries on a scale of 0 to 100 as assessed by the Institutional In-
vestor magazine. All BRIC countries have shown a signicant improvement in credit
ratings during the 2000s. Russia showed the largest improvement from roughly 20
in 1999, right after the currency crisis, to above 70 in 2008, right before the recent
crisis. The second panel plots an index of the ease of credit availability for businesses
(IMDWCY executive survey index from 0 to 10). The gure shows that credit avail-
ability increased in all countries during the 2000s until the global crisis later in the
decade. The increase in credit availability is consistent with the growth in private
credit and FDI shown above. The third panel plots an index of how encouraging
the cost of capital is for business development (IMD WCY executive survey). This
further indicates that the increase in domestic capital was driven by an increase in
the a¤ordability of capital rather than the demand for it. These gures suggest that
nancial liberalization in the BRIC nations led to capital inows fueled by rising
credit ratings and increased the availability of capital for domestic businesses.
Financial development is also consistent with observed production e¢ ciency. On
one hand, an increase in production e¢ ciency should increase capital inows as
higher (perceived) e¢ ciency leads to higher expected growth and lower probabilities
of default, which is reected in the rise in the country credit ratings. On the other
hand, an increase in capital inows can a¤ect production e¢ ciency through various
channels. First, as discussed in Findlay (1978), an increase in FDI inows could gen-
erate productivity spillovers through the import of managerial and organizational
capital from foreign rms with superior e¢ ciency. This e¤ect could be particularly
important in the banking sector as it improves the domestic resource allocation and
thus the economy-wide e¢ ciency. Next, as shown in Obstfeld (1994), greater diversi-
cation of income risk can lead to production specialization and the pursuit of riskier
investment projects with high expected return. Finally, as discussed in Rajan and
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Zingales (2003), international nancial integration will impose discipline on macro-
economic policies as transparency and good governance is essential to attract foreign
capital and avoid capital ight.
An interesting question would be why nancial development might have impacted
growth in e¢ ciency in Brazil and Russia to a greater extent than in India and China,
which particularly becomes apparent after 200430. One important di¤erence in these
economies is the development stage that they were at when the reforms commenced.
Brazil and Russia were coming out of a stagnation in early 2000s while India and
China were already on the stable growth track since the 1990s31. Therefore, it might
be the case that in Brazil and Russia, the impact of nancial development on growth
is much stronger - a case of catching up - as compared to India and China which were
already on a stable development track32. India, in particular, is an aberration where
e¢ ciency suddenly collapsed after mid-2000s and we conjecture that the positive
impact of nancial development was overwhelmed by other factors that caused the
e¢ ciency collapse.
While so far we have discussed the impact of nancial liberalization on the domes-
tic nancial market, we now track some institutional and governance indicators that
provide the necessary framework for successful nancial development and growth.
Empirical data on these indicators range from cross-sectional (cross country) mea-
sures like legal origin, judicial e¢ ciency as included in the LLSV index (La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1997, 1998, 1999) to time-series measures as
provided by the World Bank. Since our focus is to trace the development of BRIC
policies over time, we focus on six time-series measures considered as conducive to
economic development (denitions and explanations are in Appendix D)
<Figure 7c about here>
Figure 7c plots the six indices (Voice & Accountability, Political Stability &
Non Violence, Government E¤ectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Control
of Corruption) over time for each BRIC country and compare them to US standards
where the measure ranges from  2:5 (weak) to +2:5 (strong).
While it is clear that not all the indices show positive comovements with the time
series of the estimated wedges, the two exceptions would be government e¤ectiveness
30Bollard, Klenow and Sharma (2012) also nd that FDI liberalization had little e¤ect on the
TFP growth in Indian manufacturing rms during the 1993  2007 period.
31The growth trends in Brazil, Russia, India and China Shown in Table 3 are 1:0%, 1:8%, 4:1%
and 7:4% respectively.
32Gente, Nourry and Leon-Ledesma (2012) show that nancial liberalization can have positive or
negative impacts on productivity growth depending on the national savings level in an endogenous
growth setting with human capital accumulation.
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and political stability to some extent. In terms of government e¤ectiveness, BRIC
nations registered considerable improvement particularly since early 2000s, though
still below the developed world. The indices in almost all instances move from
negative to positive with almost doubling of the index value between 1996 and 2009.
Even in case of Russia that scores the lowest, a 30% improvement in score is witnessed
during the last decade. This translates to a 10  rank climb in percentile ranks for
all nations, with the exception of India that just climbs two spots.
In terms of political stability, which is related to non violence and absence of
terrorism, we witness a decline in 1990s till about mid-2000s when there is a turn-
around. Brazil, the top scorer earns a score of  0:1 (still in negatives though an
improvement from 0:35 in the 1990s). The most improvement was noticed in Russia
that came out of the turbulent political transition of the 1990s to a more favorable
domestic political climate. India is the only nation which seems to lag behind, not
surprisingly due to its continued vulnerability to terrorism. In US too, political
stability score has reduced from 0:9 to 0:5 over the last two decades as a fallout
of the events of September 11; 2001. Rule of law in BRICS also improved, though
India, the top performer in terms of rule of law saw some deterioration during mid
2000s. Regulatory control and control of corruption remains two areas where BRIC
nations have to improve, though we do see some improvement over the last decade.
The exceptions are Brazil - the leader in regulatory control - that saw a dip in 2000s
and Russia, which shows an increase in corruption and ranks below the other BRIC
nations. The nal measure - voice and accountability - is related to political a¢ liation
and countries with more democratically inclined political systems - India and Brazil
- outperform Russia and China.
7 Conclusion
The growth of the BRIC nations - Brazil, Russia, India and China, has garnered
much attention in the last decade. Though studies exist discussing some potential
forces that aided growth, mostly focusing on countries in isolation, literature is sparse
regarding a cohesive study of all BRIC nations to compare unique as well as common
forces that accounted for the economic development.
In this paper, we use the Business Cycle Accounting methodology to examine the
mechanisms of growth in all BRIC nations- avenues through which policy changes and
reforms might have worked to spur growth. Our hope was to identify some unique as
well as common forces underlying economic development of this block. Our results,
which are robust to methodological alternations, as well as model modications, show
that while each nationsexperience was unique, Brazil and Russia, nations that came
o¤ a crisis period in the 1990s to register impressive growth in the 2000s, benetted
mostly from improved e¢ ciency. India and China, both on a relatively stable growth
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path since 1990s, saw a growth spurt in 2000s that can be largely accounted for by
improvements in investment wedges, particularly in the latter half.
Relating the observed improvement in e¢ ciency and investment wedges to policy
measures, we study nancial liberalization and institutional and governance reforms
in the BRIC nations using time series evidence. Both private sector access to domes-
tic credit as well as net FDI inows show improvements since early 2000s. Accord-
ingly, nancial indicators such as the country credit rating, credit availability, and
capital a¤ordability have improved, reecting the domestic nancial development
which explains the recent improvement in investment wedges in all countries. One
remaining question is why in Brazil and Russia nancial development was accom-
panied by an improvement in e¢ ciency while in India and China it was not. While
we document that it relates to the development stage- Brazil and Russia coming
out of a crisis to play catch-up and India and China already on a stable path-we
leave further analysis of this topic for future research. According to institutional and
governance indicators, BRIC nations have a long way to go before they catch up
with the more developed Western nations. BRIC countries have taken steps in this
direction by signing an accord to boost credit for trade transactions and authorizing
establishment of a multilateral bank for funding projects in the developing world in
the latest BRIC summit on March 29; 2012 with hopes of further such initiatives in
the 2013 annual meeting of the BRICS.
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A Linearization Appendix
Dene the log linearization of each detrended variables from their steady states as
evt = ln bvt   ln v
Then the linearized equilibrium conditions are
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Finally, we consider three cases regarding the denition of g!e;t. The rst case
follows Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007) where e¢ ciency wedges !e;t directly
a¤ect the level of productivity: g!e;t = et: (Model I)
In the second case, we dene e¢ ciency wedges as the growth of productivity between
the previous period and the current period:
g!e;t = et  gt 1: (Model II)
Finally, in the third case, we dene e¢ ciency wedges as the growth of productivity
between the current period and the next period:
g!e;t = gt 1   et: (Model III)
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B Additional Tables Appendix- Parameters of the
Vector AR (1) Stochastic Process of theWedges
Table A: The Bayesian Priors for structural estimation of wedges
Prior Distribution Prior Mean Prior Variance
P Diagonal Beta 0:8 0:2
P O¤-Diagonal Normal 0 0:2
V Standard Deviation Inverse Gamma 0:05 inf
V Correlation Uniform 0  1; 1
Table B: Parameters of the Vector AR(1) Stochastic Process driving the
wedges -Benchmark Model
P V
Brazil
0:7930 0:1990  0:3160  0:1370 0:0010 0:0000 0:0000 0:0000
 0:3500 0:7940 0:3260  0:2630 0:0000 0:0020 0:0000 0:0000
 0:0790 0:0200 0:7940  0:0350 0:0000 0:0000 0:0010 0:0000
 0:0070  0:0510 0:6710 0:8040 0:0000 0:0000 0:0000 0:0000
Russia
0:9330 0:1890 0:2230 0:6110 0:0080  0:0140 0:0000 0:0000
 0:3470 0:8690  0:5420  0:1030  0:0140 0:1490 0:0000  0:0030
0:0390  0:0410 0:9760  0:1290 0:0000 0:0000 0:0000 0:0000
0:0220  0:0470  0:1000 0:8090 0:0000  0:0030 0:0000 0:0010
India
0:8440 0:0110  0:2890 0:2360 0:0090 0:0000 0:0000  0:0020
0:2390 0:7790 0:3890  0:0110 0:0000 0:0240  0:0010 0:0000
 0:0050 0:0050 0:9400  0:2730 0:0000  0:0010 0:0000 0:0000
 0:0080 0:0610  0:0110 0:7310  0:0020 0:0000 0:0000 0:0010
China
0:8250 0:0280 0:0900 0:0860 0:0020 0:0010 0:0000 0:0000
 0:0150 0:8690 0:3800  0:0490 0:0010 0:0100 0:0000 0:0000
 0:0110 0:0050 0:7860  0:1410 0:0000 0:0000 0:0000 0:0000
0:1070 0:0330  0:3730 0:8220 0:0000 0:0000 0:0000 0:0000
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Table C: Parameters of the Vector AR(1) Stochastic Process driving the
wedges -Model II
P V
Brazil
0:5490 0:0047 0:0429  0:0217 0:0010 0:0001 0:0003 0:0000
0:0266 0:8200  0:0707 0:0221 0:0001 0:0024 0:000 0:0000
0:1770 0:0167 0:6164 0:0723 0:0003 0:0000 0:0046 0:0000
 0:0975 0:0753 0:2248 0:8709 0:0000 0:0000 0:0000 0:0002
Russia
0:5668 0:0464 0:054 0:1516 0:0026  0:0024  0:0121  0:0008
 0:3264 0:7534  0:0127 0:3876  0:0024 0:8214 1:6147  0:0113
0:0796  0:3596 0:5894  0:1432  0:0121 1:6147 3:1985  0:0235
 0:6895 0:2033  0:0584 0:8550  0:0008  0:0113  0:0235 0:0050
India
0:5906  0:0294  0:0112 0:5543 0:0122  0:0017  0:0001  0:0024
0:2724 0:8427 0:2137  0:0676  0:0017 0:0268  0:0005  0:0007
 0:0013  0:0005 0:9449  0:2645  0:0001  0:0005 0:0001  0:0001
 0:1240 0:0566  0:0563 0:7311  0:0024  0:0007  0:0001 0:0008
China
0:4931  0:0009 0:0624 0:0832 0:0022 0:0006  0:0071  0:0003
0:6399 0:8373 0:2618  0:3045 0:0006 0:0106  0:0024 0:0008
0:7828 0:0157 0:6470  0:5072  0:0071  0:0024 0:0456 0:0036
 0:2634 0:0195 0:0378 0:9684  0:0003 0:0008 0:0036 0:0008
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Table D: Parameters of the Vector AR(1) Stochastic Process driving the
wedges -Model III
P V
Brazil
0:6078 0:1327  0:4426 0:0945 0:0009 0:0000 0:0002  0:0001
0:1489 0:7636 0:3575  0:0446 0:0000 0:0019 0:0000  0:0002
0:2001  0:0175 0:7729 0:0463 0:0002 0:0000 0:0006 0:0000
 0:3876 0:0148 0:5559 0:8092  0:0001  0:0002 0:0000 0:0002
Russia
0:7895 0:0180 0:0654 0:2833 0:0085 0:0195  0:0001  0:0010
 0:1659 0:8373  0:2054 0:2147 0:0195 0:0984 0:000  0:0041
0:3150  0:0646 0:9177  0:1507  0:0001 0:0000 0:0002  0:0001
 0:2272  0:0203  0:1627 0:8610  0:0010  0:0041  0:0001 0:0010
India
0:5858 0:0152  0:2131 0:2100 0:0150 0:000 0:0003 0:0007
 0:0100 0:8537 0:1355  0:1041 0:0000 0:0272  0:0009  0:0007
0:0170  0:0003 0:9489  0:2441 0:0003  0:0009 0:0001  0:0001
 0:1805 0:0476  0:0699 0:8130 0:0007  0:0007  0:0001 0:001
China
0:7457 0:0259  0:0299 0:0999 0:0020 0:0004 0:0084  0:0002
1:1285 0:8002  0:1127  0:1722 0:0004 0:0110  0:0022 0:0003
 0:7322 0:1422 0:8069 0:2940 0:0084  0:0022 0:0370  0:0011
0:3301  0:0192  0:1401 0:8972  0:0002 0:0003  0:0011 0:0004
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C Data Appendix
C.1 Data Sources
Table A1 presents the original sources of the data. PWT stands for Penn World
Tables edition 7.1 and the extensions made by Duncan Foley. EM stands for the
Eurominotor Global Market Information Database. ILO stands for the International
Labor Organization LABORSTA database. The details of data construction follows.
Table A1. Original Sources of the Data
GDP PWT
Consumption share PWT
Investment share PWT
Employment PWT
Hours worked per worker EM
Population PWT
Adult Share in Total Population ILO
Household Expenditure on Durables EM
Net xed Capital Stock PWT33
Depreciation PWT34
Household Income Share of Capital EM
Employment E is computed from the PWT data of GDP per capita (rgdpl2) and
GDP per person counted in total employment (rgdpl2te) and population (POP ):
E =
rgdpl2
rgdpl2te
 POP:
Labor L, which is dened as total hours worked, is the product of hours worked per
worker h and employment. The adult population is computed using the data from
ILO of the adult share in total population and the population data from PWT.
In order to compute the household expenditure on durables Xd, we use the con-
sumer expenditure data of EM and the data of PWT for consumption share of GDP
(kc), GDP per capita (rgdpch) and population (POP ):
Xd =
consumer expenditure on durables
consumer expenditure
 kc rgdpl2 POP:
The household income share of capital h is derived from EM data on household
income:
h = 1  gross income from employmentgross income ;
33For Russian capital stock and depreciation we refer to Izyumov and Vahaly (2008) because the
Foley database reports capital stock data only for the 2004-2008 period.
34Izyumov and Vahaly (2008) assume a constant 5% annual depreciation.
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C.2 Imputing Service Flow from Consumer Durables
Consumption expenditure Cx in the data is dened as
Cx = Cnd + Cs +Xd;
where Cnd, Cs andXd stand for the household expenditures on non-durables, services
and durables. However, consumption in the model C is dened as
C = Cnd + Cs + Cd;
where Cd stands for the services ow generated from durable stocks. Investment X
is dened as the sum of gross domestic capital formation Xf and Xd. Output Y is
dened as the sum of GDP and Cd. Total capital stock K is the sum of net xed
capital stock Kf and the stock of consumer durables Kd.
The service ow from consumer durables Cd is imputed as
Cd = Kd(Rk + d):
where Rk is the net return on capital stock and d is the depreciation rate of consumer
durables assumed to be equal to 0:2. The stock of consumer durables follows a law
of motion:
Kd;t+1 = (1  d)Kd;t +Xd;t;
where the stock of consumer durables in 1990 is assumed to be equal to
Kd;1990 =
Xd;1990
d
:
The net return on capital Rk is dened as
Rk = f
GDP
Kf
  f ;
where f is the income share of net xed capital stock and f is the depreciation rate
of net xed capital stock. The income share of net xed capital stock is derived as
f =
h NNP + 
GDP
;
where h is the household income share of capital which is directly obtained from
data,  stands for the depreciation of net xed capital stock and NNP = GDP  .
The depreciation rate of net xed capital stock is computed as
f =

Kf
:
Finally, total capital share  is dened as
 =
f GDP + Cd
Y
:
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D Institutional and Governance Indicators - Def-
initions and measurement details
World Bank collects data on a set of institutional and governance indicators from
212 nations and we have the time series since 1996. In each instance, measures
range from  2:5 to +2:5 with standard errors reecting variability around the point
estimate. The indicators are based on 30 aggregate data sources, survey and expert
assessments. The details can be found in:
Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2010). "The Worldwide
Governance Indicators : A Summary of Methodology, Data and Analytical Issues",
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1682130
(1) Voice and Accountability - reects perceptions of the extent to which a coun-
trys citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom
of expression, freedom of association, and a free media
(2) Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism - reects perceptions of
the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconsti-
tutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism
(3) Government E¤ectiveness - reects perceptions of the quality of public ser-
vices, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility
of the governments commitment to such policies
(4) Regulatory Quality - reects perceptions of the ability of the government to
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote
private sector development
(5) Rule of Law - reects perceptions of the extent to which agents have con-
dence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of
crime and violence
(6) Control of Corruption - reects perceptions of the extent to which public power
is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as
well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.
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Table 5a: Decomposition of Output - Benchmark Model
Source: Authorscalculations
1990:2009
Brazil Russia India China
E¢ ciency Wedges 0:293 1:826 0:039 0:726
Government Consumption Wedges  0:151  0:196 0:014 0:049
Investment Wedges 0:368  0:570 0:874 0:218
Labor Wedges 0:490  0:060 0:073 0:006
1990:1999
E¢ ciency Wedges  0:535  0:746 0:796 0:991
Government Consumption Wedges  0:047 0:037  0:118  0:005
Investment Wedges 0:609 1:619 0:265  0:142
Labor Wedges 0:973 0:090 0:057 0:155
2000:2009
E¢ ciency Wedges 0:932 1:559  0:128 0:415
Government Consumption Wedges  0:153  0:041 0:005 0:131
Investment Wedges 0:143  0:437 1:054 0:720
Labor Wedges 0:078  0:082 0:068  0:266
48
Table 5b: Decomposition of Investment to Output Ratio -
Benchmark Model
Source: Authorscalculations
1990:2009
Brazil Russia India China
E¢ ciency Wedges 0:041  0:110 0:106 0:139
Government Consumption Wedges 0:147 0:485  0:037  0:113
Investment Wedges 0:694 0:676 0:802 0:698
Labor Wedges 0:119  0:051 0:129 0:277
1990:1999
E¢ ciency Wedges 0:147 0:204 0:374 0:018
Government Consumption Wedges 0:044 0:393 0:213 0:312
Investment Wedges 0:848 0:400 0:147 0:516
Labor Wedges  0:039 0:002 0:265 0:277
2000:2009
E¢ ciency Wedges 0:073  1:051 0:001 0:072
Government Consumption Wedges 0:317 0:785  0:002  0:468
Investment Wedges 0:526 1:581 0:941 1:129
Labor Wedges 0:084  0:314 0:061 0:266
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Table 7: Decomposition of Output - Benchmark Model with
Investment Adjustment Costs
Source: Authorscalculations
1990:2009
Brazil Russia India China
E¢ ciency Wedges 0:273 2:322  0:166 0:636
Government Consumption Wedges  0:052  0:367 0:214 0:075
Investment Wedges 0:399  0:941 0:579 0:288
Labor Wedges 0:380  0:014 0:374 0:001
1990:1999
E¢ ciency Wedges  0:651  0:746 0:723 0:893
Government Consumption Wedges 0:030  0:082  0:283  0:013
Investment Wedges 0:749 1:807 0:396 0:067
Labor Wedges 0:871 0:020 0:165 0:052
2000:2009
E¢ ciency Wedges 1:123 2:234  0:331 0:298
Government Consumption Wedges  0:015  0:295 0:232 0:209
Investment Wedges  0:002  0:958 0:715 0:590
Labor Wedges  0:106 0:018 0:384  0:096
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Figure 1: Real Macroeconomic Aggregates 
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Figure 2: Wedges – Model I (Benchmark) 
 
 
Note: In our benchmark model, efficiency wedge is modeled as shocks to the level of productivity 
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Figure 3a: Simulated Output - Model I (Benchmark) 
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Figure 3b: Simulated Investment to Output Ratio - Model I (Benchmark) 
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
Brazil
Efficiency Wedges Government Wedges
Investment Wedges Labor Wedges
Data
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
China
Efficiency Wedges Government Wedges
Investment Wedges Labor Wedges
Data
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
India
Efficiency Wedges Government Wedges
Investment Wedges Labor Wedges
Data
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
Russia
Efficiency Wedges Government Wedges
Investment Wedges Labor Wedges
Data
56 
 
Figure 4: Efficiency and Investment Wedges-  
Benchmark Model, Model II and Model III  
Panel A: Efficiency Wedge 
 
Panel B: Investment Wedge 
 
Note: In models II and III, efficiency wedge is modeled as shocks to productivity growth 
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Figure 5: Simulated Output  
Panel A: Model II 
 
Panel B: Model III 
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Figure 6: Benchmark Model Simulations with Investment Adjustment Cost 
A. Simulated Output with only Efficiency Wedges 
 
 
B. Simulated Output with only Labor Wedges 
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Figure 6: Benchmark Model Simulations with Investment Adjustment Cost continued: 
C. Simulated Output with only Investment Wedges 
 
D. Simulated Output with only Government Consumption Wedges 
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Figure 7A: Flow of Domestic Credit to Private Sector and Inflows of FDI 
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Figure 7B: Financial Market Indicators 
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Figure 7c:  Measures of Institutional and Policy Reforms 
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